Index Protocol operations
The Reserve Index Protocol automates the entire life-cycle of Index DTFs with fully onchain, autonomous smart contracts. The sections below break down how the protocol handles minting, fees, and auctions.
Issuance & redemption
Index DTFs are always instantly mintable with and redeemable for a pro-rata share of their underlying assets.
In order to make life easier for users, ABC Labs provides use of a zapper via the Reserve app. Users can zap from a single token into a DTF, and vice versa.
See the Minting & Redeeming chapter for step-by-step instructions using the zapper, manual minting, or smart contract calls.
Fees & revenue
Index DTFs generate revenue through two primary fee mechanisms:
Fee type | Basis | Range | Accrual method |
---|---|---|---|
TVL (management) | Basket NAV | < 10% APY | Mint new DTF shares block-by-block |
Mint | Incoming issuance | < 5% | Mint additional shares on each mint |
Both fees are collected and distributed in the form of the DTF token itself to one or multiple recipients, as determined by governance. Fee rates and recipients can always be adjusted through governance.
A platform fee is applied to both fees before they are distributed to recipients. The platform enforces a minimum fee of 15 bps, ensuring a baseline revenue stream. Currently, the platform fee is used to buy and burn RSR.
TVL fee
The TVL fee is expressed as a percentage of the DTF's Total Value Locked and is applied continuously through a compound interest calculation.
Technical implementation
The TVL fee is implemented using a compound interest formula:
fee = 1 / (1 - fee_per_second) ^ seconds_passed - 1
Where:
fee_per_second
is set by the DTF Owner (governance)seconds_passed
represents the time since the last fee calculation
This mechanism ensures that:
- The fee is calculated and accounted for on every user interaction
- Any view functions account for the TVL Fee since the last contract update
- The fee accumulates continuously rather than at discrete intervals
Practical implications
For users and integrators, this means:
- The TVL fee effectively acts as a continuous management fee
- The longer assets remain in the DTF, the more fees accrue
- The displayed value of held tokens will gradually decrease relative to the underlying assets, reflecting the accrued fees
Mint fee
The Mint fee is a straightforward percentage fee applied whenever a user mints new DTF tokens.
Technical implementation
The calculation is a simple percentage of the mint amount:
fee_amount = mint_amount * mint_fee_percentage
user_receives = mint_amount - fee_amount
Example
- User mints 100 $COIN50
- Mint fee = 1%
- User receives 99 $COIN50
- 1 $COIN50 is set aside for fee recipients
Platform fee
After the raw tvlFee
and mintFee
are collected, the platform fee determines how those shares are split between the platform and the DTF’s designated fee-recipients.
- Progressive share – The platform keeps the percentages shown in the table below and forwards the remainder to recipients. The table rates apply slice-by-slice (tax-bracket style) to each TVL tranche.
- Floor override – If the platform fee is less than 15 bps of TVL (
tvlFee
) or minted tokens (mintFee
) in absolute terms, the contracts override the table and grant the 15 bps minimum instead.
TVL tranche | Platform keeps | Recipient share |
---|---|---|
< $100 m | 50 % | 50 % |
$100 m – $1 b | 40 % | 60 % |
$1 b – $10 b | 30 % | 70 % |
$10 b – $100 b | 20 % | 80 % |
$100 b – $1 T | 10 % | 90 % |
> $1 T | 5 % | 95 % |
Example calculations
A DTF with $3.1 billion in TVL and a TVL fee of 1% would have its platform fee calculated as:
(0.5 * 0.01 * $100 million + 0.4 * 0.01 * $900 million + 0.3 * 0.01 * $2.1 billion) / (0.01 * $3.1 billion) ≈ 33.5%
This means 33.5% of the collected fees would go to the platform, and the remaining 66.5% would be distributed among fee recipients.
As a proportion of total TVL, the platform's portion of the TVL fee would be 33.5% * 1% = 33.5 bps
, above the minimum fee floor.
Technical implementation
The platform fee is supplied to DTFs via a Platform Fee Registry contract, which is controlled by the platform owner multisig. This registry also provides DTFs with the current platform fee recipient address.
Practical implications for users
For governance stakers
- Fee distribution to governance token holders follows an exponential distribution model over time to maintain vote-locking incentives at all times
- Governance token holders can claim their pro-rata share of fees based on their staked tokens
For traders and holders
- When holding DTF tokens, be aware that the TVL fee continuously accrues, effectively acting as a management fee
- When minting new DTF tokens, account for the one-time Mint fee in your calculations
For integrators
- Implement accurate fee calculations in your interfaces to provide users with precise token valuations
- Ensure your integration accounts for both fees when estimating transaction outcomes
Rebalancing
Rebalancing assets is a core functionality of the protocol. This section summarizes the parameters, roles, and functions involved in each stage of the rebalancing process:
- Kick-off — A
REBALANCE_MANAGER
proposes new basket targets, per-asset buy/sell limits, and conservative low/high price brackets for each asset. - Auction window — For every token pair that needs adjustment, an
AUCTION_LAUNCHER
(or any account after a 120 s grace period) callsopenAuction
, minting a sell lot sized so the basket always stays within those limits. - Price curve — Each auction follows an exponential decay from
startPrice
toendPrice
(both derived from the submitted brackets or tightened by the launcher). Curve length is governance-configurable. - Settlement — Bidders supply the buy-asset and receive the sell-asset. When the lot clears or its time-to-live expires, the auction closes. The entire rebalance ends automatically at TTL or when the manager kicks off the next cycle.
This design lets an Index DTF migrate toward its target weights gracefully, using market pricing rather than oracle pushes, while preserving fully onchain execution.
Auction pricing
Any alteration of a DTF’s basket is done via a two-token dutch auction. Each auction is configured with parameters to define which tokens are to be traded, the pricing curve of the auction that will handle the auction, and the target end ratios of the tokens in the basket.
When configuring an auction for approval by governance, the Expected Volatility (EV) presets can be used to set the pricing curve and target token ratios. Choosing Low EV will configure a smaller pricing curve with more compact target ratio ranges, while choosing High EV will configure a much wider pricing curve with wider target ratio ranges.
When launching an auction via the Reserve app as the Auction Launcher, the EV presets can again be used to set the final pricing curve and target ratios. Future app updates will allow more advanced users to tweak these parameters directly.
Auction timing
One final parameter that gets set by the Auction Approver is time-to-live (TTL). This parameter defines how long an auction can exist in the Approved state before it is considered invalid and can no longer be launched.
The TTL matters significantly, especially with respect to the Admin-defined DTF parameter Auction Delay. The AD defines how much time an auction can exist in the Approved state before it can be launched by anyone. Before the delay ends, the only actor that can launch the auction is the Auction Launcher.
If TTL is set longer than AD then the auction will realize a period during which the auction can be launched permissionlessly, adding to the DTF’s decentralization. If TTL is set at or below AD, then the Auction Launcher will be the only actor that is ever able to launch the auction. This gives more control to the Auction Launcher and entrusts them with more responsibility, so any Auction Approver should be sure about the TTL that they set.
Anyone can create an RToken
In a similar way as how anyone can create a new trading pair on Uniswap, anyone can permissionlessly create a new Reserve stablecoin (RToken) by interacting with Reserve Protocol’s smart contracts. The protocol applies a system of factory smart contracts that allows anyone to deploy their own smart contract instance.
Creating an RToken can be done either by interacting directly with the Reserve Protocol’s smart contracts or any user interface that gets built on top of it. The first user interface for these smart contracts will be released by ABC Labs the company that's leading protocol development. Besides the creation of RTokens, this user interface will also support exploring usage and stats related to RTokens, RToken minting & redeeming, and RSR staking.
Non-compatible ERC20 assets
The following types of ERC20s are not supported to be used directly in an RToken system. These tokens should be be wrapped into a compatible ERC20 token to be used within the protocol. A concrete example is the use of Static ATokens for Aave V2.
- Rebasing Tokens that return yields by increasing the balances of users
- Tokens that take a "fee" on transfer
- Tokens that do not expose the decimals() in their interface. Decimals should always be between 1 and 18.
- ERC777 tokens which could allow reentrancy attacks
- Tokens with multiple entry points (multiple addresses)
- Tokens with multiple entry points (multiple addresses)
- Tokens that do not adhere to the ERC20 standard in general
Advanced RToken parameters
When deploying an RToken, the deployer has the ability to configure many different advanced parameters. The following list goes into detail about what these parameters do and some of the factors the deployer should keep in mind to set them.
As many of these parameters concern the Protocol Operations, we advise reading through that section of the documentation first—as it will give the deployer the necessary context to fully understand all parameters.
Trading delay(s)
The trading delay defines how many seconds should pass after the basket has been changed before a trade can be opened.
A collateral asset can instantly default if one of the invariants of the underlying DeFi protocol breaks. If that would happen, and we would not apply a trading delay, the protocol would react instantly by opening an auction. This would give only auctionLength seconds for people to bid on the auction, making it very possible for the protocol to lose value due to slippage.
The trading delay parameter may only be needed in the early days - before we get to a point where there is a robust market of MEV searchers. We expect that this parameter can be set to zero later on (once a robust market of MEV searchers is established).